Should they have grounded the Boeing 737 MAX 8?

Hey aviation enthusiasts,

Of course, as we ALL know, there has been a whole 737 MAX crisis going on this past half a month. They've been grounded worldwide, not one left in the air. The thing IS, they don't exactly know what caused the Lion Air or Ethiopian Airlines crashes, and even though they think it's MCAS, they don't know for sure. I don't know what to think in terms of if they should've grounded it. I want you guys's opinion on this. Should the world have grounded the Boeing 737 MAX 8?

TheAviationEnthusiast

346 lives lost, yes the grounding was necessary. Two flights with similar flight incidents, a few months apart from each other. Seasoned pilots have been voicing concerns that something was not correct with the flight characteristics they were experiencing. It has been reported that some of the US carrier pilots have had the same incidents, but, managed to overcome the situation by disabling the MCAS system.

I don't believe you will ever hear an admission of fault in either the MCAS or any other component which could have contributed to these unfortunate air disasters, because an admission of fault is an admission of liability to Boeing. JMHO.

I do hope they find the solution, as Boeing has always been a reputable manufacturer of jetliner aircraft. It's no different than automobiles, or any other consumer goods that are manufactured. In some malfunctions of items not relating to passenger aircraft, the manufacturer merely identifies the problem and then issues a product recall to remedy. In the case of Boeing 737 MAX 8/9, it's not that easy. Too many lives lost, before admitting a problem exists!

I, too, am anxious to see others' comments on this subject!

Rick :cool:

A disclaimer first: I'm not an airline pilot, though I have years of experience as a CFI in quite a variety of lighter aircraft. I have no special pipeline to the investigation, either. So the following set of opinions is based on what I've read in the media, including AOPA, and on what I know of pilot training, both through my own experience and from talking over the years to friends who ARE in the airlines, one even was a United instructor for a number of years (besides flying F-16s for the guard). So, on that basis^%:

From everything I've read (and seen on TV), it appears that it's not so much that there's anything inherently wrong with the software change, other than maybe that each additional activation is additive until the trim reaches its max. So the best solution (IMO) is to provide the updated documentation and training that should have been provided in the first place to all who fly the aircraft*, so that each pilot is aware there have been operational changes. Then once all pilots at a line that is operating the aircraft are properly trained and tested, to remove the grounding for that airline only -- one at a time or concurrently doesn't matter, just on a per company basis (or even a per pilot basis). From the various reports I've read, it appears that pilots who are up to date on runaway trim procedures, for whatever reason, have done OK when encountering the problem, while pilots who aren't up to date on the runaway trim procedures have problems.

Again, opinion, it appears from what I have read that U.S. pilots have dealt with this situation just fine, but some non-U.S.^# pilots apparently haven't really mastered their emergency procedures.

Chances are very good that someone else is more in the know, so perhaps we'll hear something more up to date and/or accurate.

* There's at least one article out there (AOPA, I think) that points out that flipping the switches to disable the electric auto trim (they showed a picture of the two toggle switches) would have disabled the auto trim so that it couldn't run away.

Note that even in general aviation, pilots who fly more complex aircraft must learn how to disable the autopilot trim function in case of runaway, so it's not rocket science, just training (IMHO).

^# There are indications out there of poor training in some (nowhere near all) countries, such as the Asiana flight short of the runway a few years back (a number of others, too). Whether it's an individual pilot thing or something missing in the training for each of the involved airlines is something I don't know.

^% The information in the post is tentative, pending further info, and is probably more speculative than it should be, so take it ALL with a grain of salt (perhaps half a shaker full?).

A disclaimer first: I'm not an airline pilot, though I have years of experience as a CFI in quite a variety of lighter aircraft. I have no special pipeline to the investigation, either. So the following set of opinions is based on what I've read in the media, including AOPA, and on what I know of pilot training, both through my own experience and from talking over the years to friends who ARE in the airlines, one even was a United instructor for a number of years (besides flying F-16s for the guard). So, on that basis^%:

 

From everything I've read (and seen on TV), it appears that it's not so much that there's anything inherently wrong with the software change, other than maybe that each additional activation is additive until the trim reaches its max. So the best solution (IMO) is to provide the updated documentation and training that should have been provided in the first place to all who fly the aircraft*, so that each pilot is aware there have been operational changes. Then once all pilots at a line that is operating the aircraft are properly trained and tested, to remove the grounding for that airline only -- one at a time or concurrently doesn't matter, just on a per company basis (or even a per pilot basis). From the various reports I've read, it appears that pilots who are up to date on runaway trim procedures, for whatever reason, have done OK when encountering the problem, while pilots who aren't up to date on the runaway trim procedures have problems.

 

Again, opinion, it appears from what I have read that U.S. pilots have dealt with this situation just fine, but some non-U.S.^# pilots apparently haven't really mastered their emergency procedures.

 

Chances are very good that someone else is more in the know, so perhaps we'll hear something more up to date and/or accurate.

---

* There's at least one article out there (AOPA, I think) that points out that flipping the switches to disable the electric auto trim (they showed a picture of the two toggle switches) would have disabled the auto trim so that it couldn't run away.

 

Note that even in general aviation, pilots who fly more complex aircraft must learn how to disable the autopilot trim function in case of runaway, so it's not rocket science, just training (IMHO).

 

^# There are indications out there of poor training in some (nowhere near all) countries, such as the Asiana flight short of the runway a few years back (a number of others, too). Whether it's an individual pilot thing or something missing in the training for each of the involved airlines is something I don't know.

 

^% The information in the post is tentative, pending further info, and is probably more speculative than it should be, so take it ALL with a grain of salt (perhaps half a shaker full?).

Wow, that is a very good point! Because supposedly there is a way to disable the MCAS system if it faults, but the 737 MAX pilots don't know how to do it.

I recently watched a video featuring a new prop plane with an MCAS-type system - can't remember which aircraft - perhaps a Socata?

As far as the 737 MAX: I think one of the problems with many of the airlines using them around the world, and maybe even the U.S., was that that pilots were not sufficiently trained in the nuances of the current MCAS system,a as well as how to disable it.

But the MAX definitely needed to grounded as the the lawsuits are probably already piling-up - plus, no airlines wants the specter of another crash...

However, on the Lion Air crash: That particular plane reportedly was having mechanical problems on and off for days prior to the crash with the air speed indicators - so the MCAS may have been only partially to blame on that one...

Yep, the aircraft should definitely have been grounded, it was the correct decision. Especially after the second accident, which appeared to be very similar to the first one.

Aircraft are getting incredibly complex and I'm getting more and more uncomfortable flying in modern airliners due to the myriad of electronic overrides and Internet-of-Things (IOT) etc. Maybe my understanding is too superficial, but if they can hack into cars nowadays, why can't they hack into an airliner carrying hundreds of passengers. What if these crashes were caused by a guy sitting in his living room with an i-Pad?

I concur with Larry.

I'm not so much into grounding the Max as to grounding MAX crews until they've acknowledged that they how to disable the MCAS. The Malaysian aircraft had a runaway MCAS episode the day before it crashed -- but a deadheading pilot in the jump seat told the crew how to disable the MCAS and then it flew just fine. So why didn't the crew know that the next day???

I concur with Larry.

 

I'm not so much into grounding the Max as to grounding MAX crews until they've acknowledged that they how to disable the MCAS. The Malaysian aircraft had a runaway MCAS episode the day before it crashed -- but a deadheading pilot in the jump seat told the crew how to disable the MCAS and then it flew just fine. So why didn't the crew know that the next day???

I think grounding the aircraft until the issues with the MCAS system only using one AoA sensor can be properly fixed is warranted. Having a system with so much power and such serious consequences rely on only a single source of data was a massive oversight in the design and certification of the aircraft.

On top of the instrument and software issues, yes, all crews should have been made aware of the new system. Between not behaving like a pure runaway trim issue, and happening at low altitude, there was very little time to properly diagnose and fix the issue. If the flight crews didn't know about the system at all, let alone how to disable it, why would it even cross their minds?

And then there's the issue of a warning system that would let the crew know the AoA sensor data didn't match being an optional extra. Seems like many Western airlines bought it. However, given how critical the AoA sensor is to the MCAS, why was it even optional? Looks like Boeing is making it standard now. Wonder if it will be retrofitted to existing aircraft?

Boeing rushed the MAX to market, and now the decision is coming back to haunt them.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/23/business/boeing-737-max-crash.html

The cases with the MAX flights in the US don't seem to be quite the same.

http://time.com/5550449/pilots-boeing-737-max-issues/

let alone how to disable it, why would it even cross their minds?

Those who dealt successfully with the problem recognized that it was runaway trim, not needing the extra information, though it most certainly SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED. Runaway trim has been in the emergency procedures and training for a lot of years. That's why I stated things the way I did. Had that not been a viable solution, then grounding until it was fixed would be mandatory.

Those who dealt successfully with the problem recognized that it was runaway trim, not needing the extra information, though it most certainly SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED. Runaway trim has been in the emergency procedures and training for a lot of years. That's why I stated things the way I did. Had that not been a viable solution, then grounding until it was fixed would be mandatory.

True, Boeing still should've provided the info on how to disable the MCAS system if it faults.

Those who dealt successfully with the problem recognized that it was runaway trim, not needing the extra information, though it most certainly SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED. Runaway trim has been in the emergency procedures and training for a lot of years. That's why I stated things the way I did. Had that not been a viable solution, then grounding until it was fixed would be mandatory.

Do you have a link to the cases that were successfully handled? The other MAX incidents I have seen reported weren't the same problem.

This quote from the AOPA article:

Take a look at this theatlantic.com article. Not quite a quarter of the way down they list two ASRS reports from pilots who successfully dealt with the MCAS, and several more with the 737 MAX in other areas. They also provide a link to the ASRS for searching.

You might like this Air Facts article too.

And here's another quote, this from a different AOPA article:

l

This quote from the AOPA article:

 

Pilots with 737 experience and other aviation experts told AOPA that the stabilizer trim system can be shut off with switches mounted between the pilots that either can easily reach. It appears U.S. flight crews have done exactly that when responding to similar system problems on the same jets.

 

Take a look at this theatlantic.com article. Not quite a quarter of the way down they list two ASRS reports from pilots who successfully dealt with the MCAS, and several more with the 737 MAX in other areas. They also provide a link to the ASRS for searching.

 

You might like this Air Facts article too.

 

And here's another quote, this from a different AOPA article:

 

What must be acknowledged in the ongoing MAX 8 accident investigations and follow-on analysis of Boeing and FAA conduct, is that U.S. air carriers have flown more than 50,000 flights and logged more than 100,000 hours in the Boeing MAX 8 without a mishap. If there is a problem with the MAX 8’s MCAS, it's unlikely that U.S. carriers have just been lucky not to experience it. More likely, an anomaly occurred, was handled by experienced, well-trained aircrew, and then addressed by highly qualified maintenance technicians on the ground.

 

l

Interesting, very interesting, everybody should read this.

This quote from the AOPA article:

Pilots with 737 experience and other aviation experts told AOPA that the stabilizer trim system can be shut off with switches mounted between the pilots that either can easily reach. It appears U.S. flight crews have done exactly that when responding to similar system problems on the same jets.

 

Take a look at this theatlantic.com article. Not quite a quarter of the way down they list two ASRS reports from pilots who successfully dealt with the MCAS, and several more with the 737 MAX in other areas. They also provide a link to the ASRS for searching.

I've seen those incidents reported as well. However, if you read them, they aren't MCAS issues, though the MCAS system is mentioned in the report. Both appear to be autopilot problems that were corrected by disabling the autopilot. The MCAS itself is only active when hand flying the plane with flaps up. So, while yes, there have been a lot of MAX flights elsewhere, I still haven't seen an incident reported that matches the two crashes. I suspect part of it may be due to more Western airlines having purchased the optional safety features that would have flagged erroneous AoA sensor data that neither the LionAir nor Ethiopian aircraft had. Maybe the malfunctioning sensors were caught and replaced before they could cause a serious problem?

 

^# There are indications out there of poor training in some (nowhere near all) countries, such as the Asiana flight short of the runway a few years back (a number of others, too). Whether it's an individual pilot thing or something missing in the training for each of the involved airlines is something I don't know.

 

^% The information in the post is tentative, pending further info, and is probably more speculative than it should be, so take it ALL with a grain of salt (perhaps half a shaker full?).

Knowing that the people on whom you depend, or the people whom you support, who are "experts", apparently, are the ones who came up with the "official cause" of TWA flt. 800, as well as John Kennedy Jr.'s Saratoga II incident, I would say that you need a couple of bags of salt. At least.

Knowing that the people on whom you depend, or the people whom you support, who are "experts", apparently, are the ones who came up with the "official cause" of TWA flt. 800, as well as John Kennedy Jr.'s Saratoga II incident, I would say that you need a couple of bags of salt. At least.

"A grain of salt" is supposed to be rather skeptical in itself, so I figured half a shaker would suffice. :pilot:

The thing IS, they don't exactly know what caused the Lion Air or Ethiopian Airlines crashes, and even though they think it's MCAS, they don't know for sure. I don't know what to think in terms of if they should've grounded it. I want you guys's opinion on this. Should the world have grounded the Boeing 737 MAX 8?

TheAviationEnthusiast

You already stated my opinion on this for me when you started off with your intro with "The thing IS".... So, therefore, you not only did you already provide my opinion for me on this, you have stated a fact as well, haven't you? You could simply carry on your factual observation to the reported 767 crash of Atlas Air flight 3591, couldn't you? What is your "opinion" on Airbus 330 in regards to Qantas flt. 72? I know what mine is, as far as what I call meddling engineering is concerned. By the way, I'm being generous. The actual A330 pilot calls it "psycho" automation. What about the recent Atlas Air flight 3591 crash? You want my opinion on that as well? Here's my opinion: I find it very dubious and hard to believe. To say the very least. What about two plane crashes in Cessna's 414 models where 5 people just happened to be killed in both back to back episodes? Here: "On August 5, 2018, about 1229 Pacific daylight time, a Cessna 414 airplane, N727RP, sustained substantial damage when it impacted the ground in a shopping mall parking lot in Santa Ana, California. The private pilot and four passengers were fatally injured." So about 5 months later you have yet another Cessna 414 crashing in Yorba Linda, practically the exact same Laurel Canyon-ish, SOCAL area, with exactly the same number of people killed in that incident. The N number on that one is N414RS. You saw it on the "news", right? As a side note, so, umm, has SOCAL sort of transformed into the new Bermuda Triangle or something? Or has it always been that way, and everybody goes, ..eh..:rolleyes: So then, should have all Cessna 414A's been restricted from flying? :confused:

So why are the FBI conducting a criminal investigation into the certification of the 737 Max?

Because it will HAVE to be a organisation able to ask questions of both the FAA and Boeing.

And expect an answer...

The preliminary report is out. Looks like the pilots did follow the recommended procedures.

http://www.ecaa.gov.et/documents/20435/0/Preliminary+Report+B737-800MAX+%2C%28ET-AVJ%29.pdf/4c65422d-5e4f-4689-9c58-d7af1ee17f3e